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The identification of interpretive models and methods across different 
disciplines, notably in the humanities, is one of the major objectives of 
the HERMES (Histories and Theories of Interpretation) research 
programme directed by Françoise Lavocat at the University of Paris 
Diderot-Paris 7. In the field of the theory of literary narrative, the 
issue of interpretation raises particular difficulties linked to the history 
of the discipline, or field of research, and its recent development 
(currently seen as the progression from ―classical‖ to ―postclassical‖ 
narratology
1
). On the 12th and 13th of December 2008, a bilingual, 
international conference entitled Théorie, analyse, interprétation des 
récits/ Theory, analysis, interpretation of narratives was held at the 
University of Paris Diderot-Paris 7 thanks to joint funding from the 
French National Research Agency, which finances the HERMES 
programme, and the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies and Research 
in the Department of Literature, Arts and Cinema (CERILAC). 
Sixteen scholars from Germany, Belgium, France, Japan, North 
America and Switzerland were invited to study and discuss three 
issues or sets of issues.  
1. The relations between the theory, analysis and interpretation of 
narrative. What role should theory play in the analysis and 
interpretation of narrative? What, in turn, might be the effect of the 
                                                     
1  The expression is David Herman‘s (see Herman 1999: 2-3). It signifies that 
―postclassical‖ narratology includes so-called ―classical‖ narratology 
(developed by Roland Barthes, Tzvetan Todorov, Gérard Genette, Mieke Bal, 
Gerald Prince, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, etc.) as one of its stages, but is also 
characterized by a profusion of new methods and research hypotheses. Its usage 
does not usually take theories offering an alternative to narratology into account 
(such as those developed by Käte Hamburger, S.-Y. Kuroda and Ann Banfield. 
See Patron 2009, 24 et passim and pp. 147-148 of the present volume). 
analysis and interpretation of narrative on narrative theory? Does 
taking the question of analysis and interpretation into consideration 
make it possible, for example, to choose between competing theories? 
Or finally, should narrative theory exclude certain types of modern 
―narrative‖, as Nicolas Ruwet suggests, speaking of poetry?2  
2. The relations between analysis and the “everyday” reading of 
narratives. Should analysis account for what goes on in ―everyday‖ 
readings of narrative? Do studies conducted on empirical groups of 
readers modify the analysis or even the theory of narrative? What 
should we make, for example, of the emphasis on the opposition 
between fictional narrative and non-fictional narrative in narrative 
theory, and the negation of the same opposition in works of cognitive 
psychology? 
3. The historical and cultural scope of narrative theory. How do 
classicists or specialists of Medieval literature, or non-Western 
literature, define the limits of the pertinence of the hypotheses and 
concepts of narrative theory to the analysis and interpretation of their 
respective narrative corpora? 
The term ―theory‖ is understood to refer to a set of hypotheses, 
concepts and conclusions concerning narrative in general and to imply 
that, like all scientific theories, it is distinguished by its essential 
relation to truth and falsehood. ―Analysis‖ is understood to refer to a 
set of methods and tools aimed at enabling a more accurate or precise 
description of narratives or of certain narratives in particular. Last, 
―interpretation‖ is understood to refer to the process by which the 
reader or critic, faced with the linear manifestation of a particular 
narrative, lends it meaning and, in the case of the critic, attempts to 
explain how the narrative produces such semantic interpretations or 
other meanings. 
                                                     
2  See Ruwet (1975: 349): ―[…] it wouldn‘t bother me if a poetic theory in which 
parallelisms played a central part excluded certain types of modern ‗poetry‘ – no 
more than I would be bothered by a general musical theory that took Mozart, 
Debussy, Gesualdo, Schönberg, gagaku, Gregorian chant, etc., into 
consideration but excluded, for example, John Cage‘s Radio Music as non-
music; rather I would see it as corroborating the theory‖ (my translation). 
The present volume contains the acts of the conference held in 
December 2008 with slight modifications relating to the number and 




The history of the relations between the theory, analysis and 
interpretation of literary narratives from the late 1960s (emergence of 
narratology as a discipline or field of research) to the 1990s and 
beyond (narratology ―revisited‖,3 identification of postclassical 
narratology, new relevance attached to alternative theories to 
narratology) would merit more thorough investigation. For the 
moment I will simply offer a few pointers. 
1. The interpretive abstinence of narratology. Sylvère Lotringer 
uses this expression with reference to poetics (structuralist poetics in 
general and Tzvetan Todorov‘s in particular).4 Narratology, generally 
seen as a branch of poetics, objects to interpretation due to its alleged 
subjectivity, which is rooted in the apprehension of the work by the 
critic-interpreter. See Todorov: ―The sense (or function) of an element 
of the work is its potential to enter into correlation with other elements 
of this work, and with the entire work [...]. It is not the same with 
regard to interpretation. The interpretation of an element differs 
according to the personality of the critic, his ideological positions or 
his era. To be interpreted, an element is included in a system which is 
not that of the work but that of the critic‖.5 Narratology sides with 
neutral, objective, definitive description (―Each element of a work has 
one or more senses [...] which are finite in number and which it is 
possible to establish once and for all‖6) and leaves the task of the 
                                                     
3  See the three special issues of the journal Poetics Today entitled ―Narratology 
Revisited‖ (McHale and Ronen 1990a, 1990b and 1991). 
4  See Lotringer (1971: 197).  
5  Todorov (1980 [1966: 3-4). The opposition between sense (function, functional 
potential to enter into correlation) and interpretation (meaning produced by the 
critic-interpreter) is also central to the work of A. J. Greimas, even if the latter 
calls Todorov‘s ―sense‖ ―interpretation‖ (see Greimas 1981 [1966]). There is no 
other significant mention of interpretation in Barthes (ed.) (1981 [1966]). 
6  Todorov (1980 [1966]: 4). 
interpretation or, potentially, of the evaluation of narrative to 
criticism. For Gérard Genette, refusing interpretation takes the specific 
form of refusing ―to impose coherence‖, which is dependant only on 
the persuasive faculties of the critic-interpreter: ―[...] but it would be 
unfortunate, it seems to me, to seek ‗unity‘ at any price, and in that 
way to force the work‘s coherence — which is, of course, one of 
criticism‘s strongest temptations, one of its most ordinary (not to say 
most common) ones, and also one most easy to satisfy, since all it 
requires is a little interpretive rhetoric‖7; ―I still feel as much 
repugnance toward those impositions of ‗coherence‘ that interpretive 
criticism carries off so glibly‖.8 Certain narratologists show more 
consideration for criticism and its concerns. Mieke Bal even postulates 
a complementary relation between criticism on the one hand and 
narratology (seen as ―general‖ narratology) and the science of 
literature on the other: ―The objects of criticism — the analysis, 
interpretation and evaluation of texts — require a constant interaction 
between criticism, narratology and the science of literature. If 
criticism can benefit, for its activities, from the information the other 
two disciplines provide, the latter need criticism to verify the concepts 
they propose.‖9 However, all agree that narratology as a discipline or 
field of research is not concerned with the interpretation or evaluation 
of narratives, nor even with explaining the way interpretation and 
evaluation of narratives work.
10
 
It should be noted that the representatives of alternative theories to 
narratology do not differ from narratologists on this point. Ann 
Banfield speaks of ―what is conceived traditionally as the proper 
object of literary criticism, as opposed to literary theory: questions 
concerning individual writers‘ creative selection and combination of 
forms latent in language, questions concerning the relation between 
biography (the ‗life‘) and history (the ‗time‘) and the work itself, 
                                                     
7  Genette (1983: 266). 
8  Genette (1990: 155). 
9  Bal (1977: 14), my translation. Also see the preface to the first edition of Bal 
(1997, 2004 [1985]: ix-x). 
10  With the exception of Tamar Yacobi‘s work on the interpretation of 
inconsistencies in narrative, or in certain narratives (see Yacobi 1981). 
analyses of the compatibility of style and meaning, questions of 
interpretation, and judgments of literary value‖.11 
2. The Lanser-Diengott debate (or feminist narratology debate). 
This exchange marks an important moment in the history of the 
relations between the theory, analysis and interpretation of narratives 
and, at the same time, clearly indicates the position of classical 
narratology. In 1986, Susan S. Lanser published an article called 
―Toward a Feminist Narratology‖, in which she asks ―whether 
feminist criticism and particularly the study of narratives by women, 
might benefit from the methods and insights of narratology and 
whether narratology, in turn, might be altered by the understandings of 
feminist criticism and the experience of women‘s texts‖.12 Lanser puts 
forward three main reasons for explaining why feminist criticism and 
narratology (understood as ―that branch of poetics concerned with 
defining and describing all aspects of narrative‖13) ignore each other: 
indifference to the issue of gender in narratology, whether in 
designating a canon or formulating questions or hypotheses; the 
mimetic understanding of narrative and its elements (in particular its 
characters) in feminist criticism and the semiotic understanding of the 
same elements in narratology; the importance given to the context of 
the production and reception of texts in feminist criticism and, by 
contrast, the decontextualization of narratives carried out by 
narratology. She shows, based on the study of an example, the form 
that collaboration between feminist criticism and narratology might 
take. In 1988, Nilli Diengott replied to Lanser‘s article in 
―Narratology and Feminism‖. Basing her argument on the division of 
literary studies put forward by Benjamin Hrushovsky,
 14
 she asserts 
that ―what Lanser has to say about the issues on which narratology 
and feminist criticism differ is inherent to the object and methods of 
inquiry that narratology as a theoretical poetics is focused on. Her 
analysis is based on a confusion of theoretical poetics with other fields 
within the study of literature, such as interpretation, historical poetics, 
                                                     
11  Banfield (1983: 204). 
12  Lanser (1986: 342). 
13  Idem: 362, n. 6. 
14  See Hrushovsky (1976). 
or criticism‖.15 For Diengott, ―Gender can be of great significance [...] 
in interpretation [...]. But interpretation is not narratology, not 
theoretical poetics‖, ―Obviously Lanser is interested in interpretation, 
but narratology is a totally different activity‖.16 Diengott‘s article 
today is mainly of historical interest, even if some of the issues its 
raises (for example that of the relations between the ―system of 
literature‖ and the literary works themselves, or that of the definition 
of context
17
) have a more general epistemological value. 
3. New narratologies. ―Contextualist narratology‖, ―feminist 
narratology‖, ―rhetorical narratology‖, ―‗natural‘ narratology‖, 
―cognitive narratology‖, ―historical and cultural narratology‖, etc.: the 
1990s witnessed an explosion of new forms of narratology. They all 
take up problems, such as context, gender, rhetorical transactions 
between authors, narrators and different types of receivers, the 
cognitive processes involved in narrative understanding, etc., which 
narratology had voluntarily or involuntarily ignored, and question the 
emphasis laid on description to the detriment of the interpretation and 
evaluation of narratives. As Ansgar Nünning remarks in relation to 
what he terms ―contextualist, thematic and ideological approaches‖, 
most ―are not really ‗narratologies‘ in that they are merely 
applications of narratological models and categories to specific texts, 
genres, or periods. With the possible exception of feminist 
narratology, which has arguably contributed genuinely narratological 
insights, shedding new light on ‗narrative qua narrative‘ (Prince 
1995a: 79), most of the contextualist, thematic, and ideological 
approaches have been concerned with issues that are not really 
germane to narratology‖.18 Nünning therefore proposes a distinction 
between ―applications of narratology‖, or ―narratological criticism‖ 
                                                     
15  Diengott (1988: 46). 
16  Idem: 45, 49. 
17  See ibid.: 44-45 and 46, Lanser (1988: 55 and 56), Prince (1995: 77-78 and 78-
82) and Roussin in the present volume (pp. 48, 53-54). 
18  Nünning (2003 [2000]: 251). Note that Nünning‘s ―thematic approaches‖ do not 
designate the same reality as Raphaël Baroni‘s ―thematic narratology‖ in the 
present volume (188, 191). Baroni‘s ―thematic narratology‖ is equivalent to 
―story (oriented) narratology‖ or ―syntactic narrative theory‖ in Nünning‘s 
article. 
(an expression used by Gerald Prince
19), and ―narratology properly 
speaking‖, specifying that it is not so much a binary opposition as a 
gliding scale between two poles. 
4. The Darby-Kindt and Müller debate (or contextualist 
narratology debate). The article published in 2001 by David Darby 
entitled ―Form and Context: An Essay in the History of Narratology‖ 
provoked two sorts of reaction. The first concerned the comparison it 
put forward between German narrative theory and structuralist 
narratology and its main developments in the United States.
20
 The 
second, which is the one that interests me here, concerns the 
reorientation it advocates in favour of a ―contextualist‖ or 
―functionalist‖ narratology,21 associating narratological analysis and 
the interpretation of narratives in the context of their production and 
reception, with the implied author as a key concept. In ―Narratology 
and Interpretation: A Rejoinder to David Darby‖, Tom Kindt and 
Hans-Harald Müller show the limits of Darby‘s historical and 
epistemological study (―A Paradigm Shift‖22) and present the concept 
of the implied author as ―an endless source of conceptual 
confusion‖.23 ―Like most contextualist manifestos‖, they argue, 
―Darby‘s examination of previous work in the field creates the false 
impression of an obligation to choose between a classic structuralist 
theory of narrative that rejects interpretation of literary texts and a 
contextualist-functionalist narratology that includes such 
interpretation. The comparison leaves out the possibility of 
understanding narratology as a heuristic tool rather than a theory of 
interpretation‖.24 Like Nünning, they consider that, in practice, the 
                                                     
19  See Prince (1995: 77).  
20  See Fludernik (2003). 
21  The expression ―contextualist narratology‖ stems from Seymour Chatman (see 
Chatman 1990); the adjective ―functionalist‖ from Meir Sternberg (see 
Sternberg 1992: 529). 
22  Kindt and Müller (2003a: 415). 
23  Idem: 417. On the implied author, also see Kindt and Müller (2006). 
24  Kindt and Müller (2003a: 416). Reference is made to Kindt and Müller (2003b); 
see, notably: 211-215. Note that Darby never uses the expression ―theory of 
interpretation‖ while Kindt and Müller, in their different works and articles on 
the question, are not entirely clear on its meaning, which is synonymous at 
contextualist approach is more a form of criticism than of narratology: 
―As far as we can see, contextualist analyses of narrative have so far 
limited themselves to applying the vocabulary of classic narratology 
in interpretive contexts. Instead of presenting a new conception of 
narratology, they merely demonstrate the heuristic usefulness of 
traditional narrative theory.‖25  
5. Kindt and Müller have published several works and articles 
dealing in full or in part with the issue of the relations between 
narratology, or narrative theory more generally, and interpretation.
26
 
They are also responsible for a taxonomy of positions held within 
narratology regarding interpretation (―autonomist‖, ―contextualist‖, 
―foundationalist‖ and ―heuristic‖27) and an attempt to define the 
requirements narratology needs to fulfil in order to be what they term 
―an interpretive heuristic‖.28 It is unfortunate, however, that they have 
also contributed to focussing attention on the problem put to 
narratology by contextualist approaches to the detriment of other ways 
of viewing the relations between narrative theory and interpretation. 
Last, despite a considerable difference of calibre, their position 
resembles Diengott‘s on a number of points: defence of traditional 
narratology, seen as a non-problematic source of knowledge; strict 
opposition between description and interpretation (whatever 
constitutes description is not interpretation and vice versa); refusal of 
the ―corpus argument‖, according to which narratological models and 
methods might be modified by extending the narratological corpus; 
viewing narrative theory as an analytic discipline working with 
concepts (like philosophy) and not as an empirical discipline or field 
of research (like linguistics for example). 
 
                                                                                                                  
times with ―approach‖ or ―interpretive grid‖ (such as feminism, psychoanalysis 
or indeed Marxism, which they do not mention) and at others with ―general 
theory of interpretation‖ (such as Umberto Eco‘s, for example). 
25  Kindt and Müller (2003a: 417, n. 14). The sentence is repeated in almost 
identical form in Kindt and Müller (2003b: 210-211). 
26  See Kindt and Muller (2003b, 2006: 63-148), Kindt (2007: 65-78) and (2008). 
27  See Kindt and Muller (2003b: 206-209). Also see Roussin in the present volume 
(50-51). 
28  See Kindt and Müller (2003b: 209 and 211-215).  
* 
 
To my mind, an interesting object of study in the context of the 
HERMES programme and the Theory, Analysis, Interpretation of 
Narratives conference more specifically was the manner in which the 
application of narratological models and methods (which are in 
principle non-interpretive, since they deal with the similarities 
between the work and other works, whereas interpretation is supposed 
to identify what makes it unique) determines the properties of the 
work and thereby prescribes a particular interpretive framework. My 
position is aligned to feminist narratology and certain ―postmodernist‖ 
developments on this point. See Lanser: ―Formalist-structuralist 
narratology may ‗know‘ that its categories are not immanent, but it 
proceeds as if they were ‗a stable and immediately knowable text, 
directly available to classificatory operations that are themselves 
neutral and innocent of interpretive bias‘ (Chambers: 18-19). Feminist 
criticism has simply not had this luxury: in its critique of masculine 
bias, it has of necessity taken the view that theory sometimes says 
more about the reader than about the text‖.29 See also Andrew 
Gibson‘s study of voice, from which I shall quote only a few lines: 
―Genette argues that ‗every narrative resonates with voice‘ and the 
concept of voice is actually indispensable to Genettian narratology 
[...]. [But] Genette never problematizes the idea of voice. While the 
manifestations of narrative voice can be classified, voice itself simply 
exists as an essence‖.30 Gibson insists on the fact that ―narratology 
based on voice is itself part of a particular cultural and ideological 
universe‖ and adds that ―other conceptions of narrative are possible.‖31 
I could also cite David Herman in his introduction to Narratologies: 
New Perspectives on Narrative Analysis (1999) and Shlomith 
Rimmon-Kenan, from the postface to the new edition of Narrative 
Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (2002), both of whom show their 
allegiance to postclassical narratology by acknowledging, notably, 
                                                     
29  Lanser (1986: 345). 
30  Gibson (1996: 144). ―Every narrative resonates with voice‖ is a quotation from 
Marc Blanchard, paraphrasing Genette (see Blanchard 1992: 65). 
31  Gibson (1996: 144). 







The book is divided into three sections, which retain the titles of the 
three sessions of the conference. It begins with two general articles, 
the first by Tom Kindt and Hans-Harald Müller, the second by 
Philippe Roussin. Kindt and Müller‘s article, which develops their 
earlier studies and articles without concluding the series (―What, 
Then, Is Narratology? A Next-to-Last Look‖), concerns the status, 
structure and function of narratology. Its authors notably reassert, 
against contextualist approaches, that narratology can and must be 
viewed as an interpretive heuristic only. In the second part of their 
analysis, they argue against the idea that success or failure 
encountered in the application of the models and methods of a theory 
is a criterion (or at least a sufficient criterion) for evaluating the 
theory. (This passage is aimed essentially at Franz K. Stanzel and his 
―verificationist‖ or ―confirmationist‖ position regarding the evaluation 
of theories). They suggest replacing the practical application criterion 
by a set of criteria dealing exclusively with the concepts used by the 
theory. The article by Philippe Roussin, who adopts a very different 
position from Kindt and Müller regarding contextualism, situates the 
evolution from classical narratology to postclassical narratology 
within the larger framework of the evolution of the humanities and 
social sciences since the 1960s (return to the forefront of the 
problematics of hermeneutics and interpretation, the ―narrative turn‖ 
in history, sociology, psychology, etc.). Roussin notably points out 
that, in a significant reversal, being set in a context is no longer 
considered to be either an essential or an incidental property of 
narrative, but rather, today narrativity itself is seen as a property 
dependent on context. He shows the problems that immediately arise, 
however, on attempting to define narrative context. Brian 
Richardson‘s article on the fictional narratives he calls ―unusual‖, 
                                                     
32  See Herman (1999: 12) and Rimmon-Kenan (2002: 139). Herman‘s sentence is 
quoted in Nünning (2003 [2000]: 245, n. 6). 
―unnatural‖ or ―non-mimetic‖ in relation to real world narratives 
provides a transition between the general articles and those based on 
case studies. Richardson puts forward several arguments in favour of 
including such narratives in the narrative theory corpus. He also 
emphasizes classical narratology‘s mimetic bias, which can be 
perceived in its understanding of history and narrative (approached via 
temporality), of the narrator and narrating (approached via the 
opposition between homodiegesis and heterodiegesis) and of character 
(a realist, anthropomorphic understanding). He emphasizes the 
unusual character of a situation where ―categories are produced for 
potential but currently nonexistent narrative types, as found in the 
work of Todorov and others, even as existing, influential, and prize-
winning narratives are ignored‖33 and calls for a reconfiguration of 
narrative theory based on an empirical examination of existing 
narratives. The next four articles are based entirely or in part on case 
studies. Henrik Skov Nielsen‘s agrees with Richardson‘s in its critique 
of unified theories of narrative, which define all narratives in relation 
to conversational narratives, which are seen as prototypical, and in its 
insistence on the not only un-prototypical, but also completely un-
typical character of fictional narratives. Based on several examples, 
including James Frey‘s A Million Little Pieces, Nielsen shows that the 
concept of the author as creator of potentially unnatural and non-
communicational forms needs to be studied anew, in lieu of the 
concept of the narrator as used in unified theories, if fictional 
narratives are to be interpreted correctly. The article by James Phelan 
(whom Nielsen cites among the representatives of unifying theories, 
but whose work also bears witness to his interest in the interpretation 
and evaluation of narratives) is a convincing exploration of ―what 
Kafka and a rhetorical narrative theory can do for each other‖: 
rhetorical narrative theory makes it possible to determine certain 
effects which make ―Das Urteil‖ (―The Verdict‖) powerful, while the 
critical reading of Kafka‘s story enriches the theory on a number of 
points. John Pier‘s article on John Barth‘s Lost in the Funhouse 
illustrates the fact that all narrative works of a certain complexity (and 
a fortiori an extremely complex narrative work like Barth‘s) 
                                                     
33  Cf. p. 68.  
represents a challenge for narrative theory (in this instance, the theory 
of embedded narrative as presented by Genette in particular). My own 
article on Juan Rulfo‘s Pedro Páramo differs from the preceding 
articles in that it starts with a theoretical opposition, the opposition 
between ―communicational‖ and ―noncommunicational‖ or "poetic‖ 
theories of fictional narrative, and sets out to put the two theories to 
the test of an empirical micro-reading. My article has some views in 
common with Nielsen‘s, but it also differs by affirming the need to 
distinguish, in fictional narrative, between elements pertaining to the 
content of the fictional representation and those pertaining to the 
means employed to construct that representation (this distinction is 
close to the one made by Phelan between ―mimetic‖ components and 
―synthetic‖ components in fictional narratives). 
The second section, entitled ―Analysis and the ‗everyday‘ reading 
of narrative‖ contains far fewer articles than the first. However, it is 
clear that several articles in the first section (those by Richardson, 
Phelan and myself in particular) contain passages which are directly 
related to the problematics of the second. This section opens with an 
article by Raphaël Baroni dealing with the postclassical understanding 
of plot and its difference from the classical, structuralist understanding 
of narrative sequentiality (accent placed on the reader‘s interpretive 
performance and its passional and cognitive dimensions; critique of 
the separation between thematic narratology, or the narratology of 
history, and discursive narratology; critique of narrative sequentiality 
being abandoned for the former; reevaluation of the discursive 
dimension of plot). Baroni‘s reader is no specialist reader, but an 
everyday reader who presses ahead and, led by powerful semanticism, 
is carried away by the story told. The two following articles form an 
antagonistic diptych about the distinction between fictional narratives 
and nonfictional narratives. Jérôme Pelletier‘s article, ―Du récit à la 
fiction: un point de vue de philosophie cognitive‖ (―From narrative to 
fiction: a cognitive philosophical viewpoint‖) takes the results of 
several brain-imaging experiments compared with hypotheses put 
forward by psychologists on the comprehension of narratives and 
asserts that ―there is no basis for distinguishing between the mental 
faculties put into action in the cognitive analysis of fictional and 
nonfictional narratives‖34 (although Pelletier postulated the existence 
of a ―fictional skill‖ defined as the capacity to manage cognitions and 
emotions in a manner adapted to representations of a fictional type). 
Marc Hersant‘s article, ―Hercule travesti: la fiction, une impasse pour 
l‘interprétation des Mémoires de Saint-Simon‖ (―Hercules distorted: 
fiction, a dead end for interpreting Saint-Simon‘s Memoires‖), shows 
the necessity of the distinction, in an equally convincing manner, for 
understanding and interpreting a work like Saint-Simon‘s. It is worth 
noting that Hersant does not claim allegiance to narratology, which he 
reminds us has only recently discovered the distinction between 
fictional and nonfictional narrative, but rather appears to find more 
food for thought in Käte Hamburger‘s narrative theory: ―A passionate 
or neurotic relationship to occurrences is not to be confused with the 
creative freedom of pure fiction in the sense of the author of The 
Logic of Literature. The subjective distortion of reality, contrary to 
what is often written, is the opposite of fiction.‖35 
The third section, which deals with the historical and cultural range 
of narrative theory, contains four articles which can be grouped two 
by two. The first, by Michèle Gally, concerns the medieval French 
novel and its relation to the ―conte‖, or tale, understood both as the 
conte it is no longer and revendicates no longer being, as shown in 
Chrétien de Troyes‘s prologues, and the conte frequently called upon 
as the origin of the story recounted (in the well-known formulae ―Or 
dist li contes que...‖, ―Or se taist atant li contes‖, etc.). For Michèle 
Gally, it amounts to a legitimizing strategy involving several 
dimensions: the linguistic dimension of the opposition between Latin 
and French; the ―mediological‖ (my adjective) dimension of the 
opposition between oral and written, and the religious dimension of 
the relationship to auctoritas. At several points, she suggests that 
noncommunicational or poetic theories of fiction, which focus on the 
work of the author, are better adapted to dealing with such narratives 
than communicational theories, which focus on the discourse of the 
(or a) narrator. Patricia Eichel-Lojkine‘s article, ―Comment interpréter 
un objet variable, le conte?‖ (―Interpreting a variable object: the 
                                                     
34  Cf. p. 227, my translation. 
35  Cf. p. 261, my translation.  
folktale‖) deals with classic European tales and concerns methodology 
more than theory in the strict sense. Taking Perrault‘s ―Puss in Boots‖ 
and comparing it to Straparola‘s and Basile‘s stories of astute cats, it 
shows the potential of combining a ―phylogenetic‖ approach to the 
tale, taking its insertion into a series of texts and intertextual motifs 
into account, with an ―ontogenetic‖ approach focussing on its 
particular arrangement. The last two articles are the work of specialists 
in Japanese literature and, in different ways, question the idea that 
Western narrative theory is universal and applicable to all cultures (the 
question is already raised in Richardson‘s article concerning unnatural 
fictional narratives). In ―La narratologie a-t-elle des frontières 
linguistiques et culturelles?‖ (―Does narratology have linguistic and 
cultural borders?‖), Akihiro Kubo offers an interesting presentation of 
Sadakazu Fujii‘s narrative theory, focusing on the concepts of the 
―zero-person‖ and ―fourth person‖, seen as emblematic of Fujii‘s 
―Asian perspective‖. His article also sheds light on the problems 
concealed by our terminology regarding issues such as the oral or 
written character of narrative, the understanding of the situation of 
production of the narrative or of the linguistic inscription of the 
narrator in the narrative. Finally, in ―La littérature japonaise et le sujet 
flottant: jalons d‘une esthétique‖ (―Japanese literature and the floating 
subject: pointers towards an aesthetics‖), Cécile Sakai examines the 
way in which certain Japanese authors (Natsume Sôseki, Yasunari 
Kawabata, Haruki Murakami) have taken advantage of the potential 
made available by the absence of a grammatically expressed subject in 
Japanese sentences. She calls for ―the development of a critical 
apparatus, in narrative theory, adapted to a configuration of gaps‖36 
and contributes to the initiative with her own analyses. These two 
articles and my own show a common interest in translation and the 
interpretive issues involved.  
The collection as a whole, in its richness and variety, with its 
omissions and, sometimes, its contradictions, which no attempt has 
been made to hide, forms a stimulating introduction to the study of the 
issues raised by the relations between the theory, analysis and 
interpretation of literary narratives, which deserves further attention in 
                                                     
36  Cf. p. 326, my translation. 
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